Orax (orax.one) presents as a browser wallet for many chains, with a team page, marketing copy about safety, and a “proof of reserves” style PDF. A quick web check does not surface a matching report in Hacken’s own public audit library — the firm named in some Orax materials. That alone would be reason to go slowly. The document trail is worse.
The published team list names real professionals who work elsewhere; nothing we saw confirms they run Orax, so treat the page as unverified branding rather than an accusation against those individuals. The audit PDF is harder to excuse. It describes outgoing test payments from listed Bitcoin addresses that a security firm supposedly watched — yet public explorers for those addresses show no matching outbound history in the research checks described. Contact emails in the file use an orax-audit.one domain, not the auditor’s own site. Reserve tables in the same pack claim enormous USDT balances while the headline liability figure does not even add up cleanly.
Meanwhile the user agreement talks like a non-custodial wallet that never holds assets — which sits oddly beside a company “reserve” story. If a stranger’s Telegram tip sends you to Orax, or any lookalike, do not deposit. Prefer wallets with long public histories, open-source clients you chose yourself, and never confuse a PDF badge with custody you can exit.
If this pattern matches something you have seen, start at Get help. If someone sells a paid “recovery” of funds stuck in a mystery wallet, read Fake recovery first.
This article is for general information only. It is not legal or financial advice. Details change. If you have lost money, contact your bank or card issuer and use the routes on the help pages.